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ABSTRACT
During the recent Financial Crisis, as well as the ongoing European Sovereign Debt Crisis, several 
governments had/have had to raise their debt levels in order to stabilize their  economies. The 
principal problem attributed to sovereign debts, which is linked to their  characteristics, is the 
possibility of defaults occurring in relation to these – since they are  usually accompanied 
without collaterals. The possibilities of such   defaults occurring are  further increased where 
bailouts are granted in relation to these debts. Increased doubts in  relation to the likelihood of 
larger sovereigns “rolling over maturing debt on their own”, as well as the consequential occurrence 
of “very high, economically penalizing, interest rates”, is considered to be the present reality.
This paper aims to illustrate why distressed countries, once granted bail-outs, should be given full 
assurance (by grantors of the bail-outs) that continued assistance will be provided in  the form of 
accompanying aids to assist in completing repayments relating to such bailouts  (through the 
extension of repayment periods or   reduced   interest rates) –   rather than  aggravating their 
position (hence facilitating the risk of defaults).
As well as a consideration of improvements which have been introduced through Basel III in 
respect   of   prudential   supervisory   tools   (supervisory   tools   such   as   capital,   liquidity 
requirements, and macro prudential policy tools), and an analysis of recent efforts which have been 
undertaken by the Basel Committee to address information gaps in derivative markets (a source of 
huge losses to many major banks), the paper also explores how the new Basel liquidity standards 
(that is, the Liquid Coverage Ratio (LCR) and the Net Stable Funding Ratio  (NSFR), could  be 
effectively  implemented in  mitigating  sovereign  debt crises. Ultimately, the paper will seek to 
demonstrate that additional leverage ratios which are to be introduced by the Basel Committee, will 
play a very crucial role if the new liquidity standards are to achieve their desired effects and stated 
objectives.
Key Words: European Sovereign Debt Crisis; Basel III; Dodd Frank Act; Capital standards; 
Liquidity   Standards; macro prudential policy tools; Over-the-Counter (OTC) derivatives; 
Credit-Default-Swaps (CDS); markets; disclosure; bank; regulation; leverage ratios
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Capital, Liquidity Standards and Macro Prudential Policy Tools in Financial
Supervision: Addressing Sovereign Debt Problems
Marianne Ojo1
A. Introduction
Even though it is argued that the most recent Financial Crisis was a capital crisis - not a liquidity 
crisis, events such as the failure of Northern Rock, as well as problems encountered  by   major 
banks  which were  considered to have been complying  with Basel  Capital requirements, are 
plausible indicators of the fact that the recent Financial Crisis was triggered by pro cyclical, as well 
as liquidity related issues such as maturity transformations. The focus  accorded by the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision to capital  requirements - as opposed to liquidity  standards, 
also  provided further justification for evidence which corroborates a lack of sufficient focus on 
matters and factors which contribute in triggering a liquidity, and ultimately, banking crises.
Whilst it is widely agreed and not disputed that capital and liquidity requirements both 
contributed to the most recent Financial Crisis, the extent to which Basel III addresses 
major/fundamental questions arising from the Crisis, provides further grounds for further 
debates. This paper considers those fundamental issues which have arisen in light of the recent 
Crisis against the background of efforts which have been made by the Basel Committee  to 
consolidate capital, liquidity standards – as well as macro prudential policy tools. As well  as 
highlighting the increased focus accorded by the Basel Committee to the macro prudential level, the 
paper will consider macro prudential policies which have been introduced to address system wide 
risks.
The first four sections of this paper (subsequent to the introductory section) will consider 
improvements   which have been introduced through Basel III   in respect of prudential 
supervisory tools. To facilitate this aim, these sections will consider capital, liquidity and macro 
prudential supervisory tools which currently exist or are about to be introduced. In emphasizing 
the need for greater focus on macro prudential policies   –   which ultimately  facilitate a more 
system-wide market based approach to regulation, sections two to five illustrate how Basel III’s 
more macro prudential focus should help facilitate the monitoring of  vital and useful information 
such as market wide data on asset prices and liquidity. The need for such monitoring being of vital 
importance since derivative markets,  (and the Over-the-Counter (O-T-C) derivatives market in 
particular – being the largest2   market for derivatives), are largely unregulated with respect to the 
1  Lessing Trebing Bert (LTB) Rechtsanwälte, Frankfurt, Germany ; Oxford Brookes University, Oxford.
      E    m a  i l:  m  a  r ia  n  n  e  o  j o    @ h  o  t m  a  i l . co  m  
2  The “OTC  derivative market is the largest market for derivatives. According to the Bank for International 
Settlements, the total outstanding notional amount is U S $684 trillion (as of June 2008). Of this notional amount, 
67 % comprise interest rate contracts; 8 % credit default swaps (CDS); 9 % foreign exchange  contracts; 2 % 
commodity contracts; 1 % equity contracts; and 12 % other. Because OTC derivatives are not  traded on an 
exchange, there is no central counter party and they are therefore subject to counter party risk – like  an ordinary 
3disclosure of information between parties.
Hence the sixth section of the paper will consider the importance of information gaps – 
particularly within OTC markets, as well as steps taken by the Basel Committee to address these. 
The second half of this paper (commencing with section six) seeks to address two  important 
aspects, namely:
i) The need to introduce measures which are aimed at facilitating greater disclosure in respect 
of complex instruments which banks are exposed to during the course of their  daily 
transactions. One of such  complex instruments being the OTC derivatives markets – 
whereby many major banks are exposed to huge losses.
A second means whereby many major banks could be exposed to huge losses is  attributed to 
sovereign debt exposures.   “Many European banks are thought to have large holdings of 
sovereign debt from the “peripheral” countries that have not been marked-to-market, and thus 
represent sizeable potential losses for the banks when the sovereign debt is ultimately 
restructured.“3
Sovereign debt exposures, the effects of bail outs resulting from sovereign debts, ways whereby 
the new Basel liquidity standards could help address sovereign debt problems (as  well as other 
measures which have been proposed), will constitute the focus of discussion in  relation to the 
remaining sections of this paper.
ii) The sovereign debt problem leads us to the second important aspect, the importance of 
timely   implementation   of   additional   leverage ratios   which   have recently   been 
introduced by  the Basel Committee. If the two new liquidity  standards, the Liquidity 
Coverage Ratio (LCR), and the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR), are introduced 
without coupling these to the additional new leverage ratios, this could lead to a 
concentration of banks’ funds – which could subsequently be vulnerable to sovereign 
exposures.
Basel III is considered to be “fundamentally different” from  Basel I and II as  a result of its 
combination of “micro and macro prudential reforms to address both institution and system level 
risks.“4
contract (since each counterparty relies on the other to perform).” See Financial Stability Board, “Implementing OTC 
Derivatives Market Reforms” 25th October 2010
<h  t t p  : / / w  w  w  . f i n  a  n  c  i a  l s  t a  b  i l i t y  b  o  a  r d  . o  r g  / pu  b  l i c  a  tio  n  s  / r _  1  0102  5  . p  d  f >   and 
also
     <  h  t t p  : / / e  n  . w  ik  i p  e  d  i a  . o  r g  / w  i k  i / D  e  r i v  a  t i v  e  _  (finance)#OTC_and_exchange_traded>
3  “The EC B and the European central banks”, it is further argued, “need to identify those banks that are impaired by 
excessive sovereign holdings and assist them in recapitalization – however, also pushing the larger, stronger banks 
to accept  exchange offers in the interest of bank transparency and restructuring as well as in  resolving the 
sovereign debt problem.” See N Economides and RC Smith, “Trichet Bonds To Resolve the European Sovereign 
Debt Problem” January 2011 at pages 2 and 3 <h  t t p  : / / w  w  w  . s  s  r n  . c  o  m  / a  b  s  t r a  c  t =  183674  3  >  
4  With respect to micro prudential aspects, Basel III reforms indicate i) “Significant increase in risk coverage – 
with focus on areas that were most problematic during the Crisis (for example, trading book  exposures, 
counterparty credit risk, and securitization activities); ii) fundamental tightening of the definition of capital – as well 
as a strong focus on common equity (introduction of requirements that all capital instruments must absorb losses at 
the point of non-viability – which was not the case during the most recent Financial Crisis); iii) Introduction of  a 
4Basel  III = Enhanced Basel II + M acro prudential Outlay5
Enhanced Basel II = M icro prudential Framework (aimed at “increasing quantity as well as 
improving  quality of capital, adequate capital charges needed in the trading book, enhancing risk 
management and disclosure, introducing a leverage ratio to supplement risk weighted measures, 
addressing counter party risk posed by Over-the Counter (OTC) derivatives.”)
M acro Prudential Outlay:
This aspect addresses:
i) ”stability over time” (pro cyclicality) through:
- Counter cyclical capital charges and forward looking provisioning
- Capital conservation rules for stronger capital buffers
ii) As well as “stability at each point in time” (system wide approach):
                  Systemic capital surcharge for systemically important financial institutions
- Identify inter linkages and common exposures among all financial institutions
- Systemic oversight of OTC derivatives (CCP infrastructure)
Weaknesses in Basel rules will be considered from the perspective attributed by such rules to 
capital and liquidity requirements.
leverage ratio which should serve as a backstop to the risk based framework; iv) the introduction of global liquidity 
standards to address short-term and long term liquidity mismatches; and v) Enhancements to Pillar 2’s supervisory 
review process and Pillar 3’s market discipline – particularly for trading  and securitization activities.” S Walter, 
“Basel III: Stronger Banks and a  More Resilient  Financial System”  h  t t p  : / / w  w  w  . bi  s  .o  r g  / s  p  e  ec  h  e  s  / s  p  1  10  40  6  . p  d  f   a  t 
page 3 of 12
5  See H Hannoun, „Towards a Global Financial Stability Framework” Bank for International Settlements
Publications page 9 of 26 
<  h  t tp  : / / w  w  w  . b  i s  .o  r g  / s  p  e  ec  h  e  s  / s  p  1  0  0  30  3  . p  d  f>  
5B. Capital Requirements
As highlighted in several papers,6    Basel II’s internal credit risk models7  were not only 
considered to be:
− Unduly risk sensitive, but also tended to generate pro cyclical effects. This was 
illustrated during the Northern  Rock Crisis.8   It has also been stated9   that Basel rules 
focused on one type of risk – the risk that a bank would make too many bad loans and lose 
so much money on those loans (such that its capital was wiped out). Whilst these 
observations reflect the magnitude of attention dedicated to capital requirements, it  also 
highlights problems   attributed to measurements in relation to such capital 
requirements.
- They also generated pro cyclical effects. Pro cyclicality is a fundamental issue arising from 
the implementation of Basel II capital requirements.
Another vital distinction between Basel II and Basel III is evident from the fact that under Basel 
III, systemically important banks will be required to have loss absorbing capacity  beyond the 
6  For example, see M Ojo, “Basel III and Responding to the Recent Financial Crisis: Progress made by  the Basel 
Committee in relation to the Need for Increased Bank Capital and Increased Quality of Loss Absorbing  Capital” 
h  t t p  : / / s  s  r n  . c  o  m  / a  b  s  t r a  c  t =168088  6     at page 3 of 15. “The introduction of Basel II resulted in changes being made to 
the 1988 Basel Capital Accord to provide for a choice of three broad approaches to credit risk. This was introduced 
into Basel II in view of the realization that the optimal balance may differ significantly across banks. The increased 
focus on risk (and particularly credit risk), resulted from growing realization of the  importance of risk within the 
financial sector. The range of approaches to credit risk – as introduced under Basel  II, and which also exists for 
market risk, consists of the Standardised approach (which is the simplest of the three broad approaches), the internal 
ratings based (IRB)  foundational and advanced approaches.” See Basel  Committee on Banking Supervision, 
“Consultative Document, Standard Approach to Credit Risk, Supporting  Document to  the New Basel Accord, 
January 2001 at page 1   h  t t p  : / / w  w  w  . bi  s  .o  r g  / p  u  b  l / b  c  b  s  c  a0  4  . p  d  f     and Basel  Committee on Banking Supervision, 
“Consultative Document, The Internal Ratings Based Approach Supporting  Document to the New Basel Capital 
Accord” January 2001 Bank for International Settlements publications
            <  h  t t p  : / / w  w  w  . b  i s  . o  r g  / pu  b  l / b  c  b  sc  a  0  5  .p  d  f >  
7  Basel II’s internal credit risk models generated pro cyclical effects – given the fact that such models were overly 
sensitive in their implementation  for  the calculation  of  regulatory capital (their implementation  to  facilitate “the 
derivation of fundamental inputs for formulas which will determine the level of capital which large  banks must 
retain”).
8  “One of the underlying features of the recent Crisis was the build-up of excessive on and off-balance sheet leverage 
in the banking system. In many cases, banks built up excessive leverage while still showing strong risk based capital 
ratios. During the most severe part of the Crisis, the banking sector was forced by the market to reduce its leverage in 
a manner that amplified downward pressure on asset prices, further exacerbating the positive feedback loop between 
losses, declines in bank capital, and contraction in credit availability.” See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
“Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework For More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems” December 2010 at 
page 68 – 69 of 77 <  h  t t p  : / / w  w  w  . b  i s  . o  r g  / pu  b  l / b  c  bs  1  8  9  . p  d  f>  
9  T Congdon, “Northern Rock Shows Up Mess of Basel Rules” January 2008 < 
h  t t p  : / / w  w  w  .t  e  l e  g  r a  p  h  . c  o  . u  k  / f i nan  c  e  / m  a  r k  e  t s  / 2  7  8  350  0  / N  o  r t h  e  r n-  R  o    ck  - s  how  s  - u  p  - m  ess  - o  f - B    as  el  - r u  l e  s  . h  t m  l >   (last 
visited 18 May 2012)
6standards approved and announced on the 12t
h 
September 2010.10 Furthermore, the Basel Committee 
and the Financial Stability Board (FSB) are “developing a well integrated approach to systemically 
important financial institutions which could include a combination of capital surcharges, contingent 
capital and bail in debt.“11
Total Regulatory Capital for systemically important banks is considered to be:
[Tier One Capital Ratio] + [Capital Conservation Buffer] + [Counter Cyclical Capital Buffer]
+ [Capital for Systemically Important Banks]12
C. Liquidity Requirements
In highlighting why the relatively low focus attached to liquidity requirements constituted another 
element of those weaknesses attributed to Basel rules, the importance of liquidity and the role of 
banks in maturity transformations (ultimately triggering banking crises), has been demonstrated in 
several respects.13   The  Liquid  Coverage Ratio (LCR) which imposes a requirement that banks 
maintain an adequate level of “unencumbered, high-quality liquid assets that can be converted to 
cash to meet its liquidity needs for a  30 calendar day time  horizon under severe liquidity stress 
conditions specified by supervisors“14 and the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) Standard which is 
designed to “promote longer-term funding of the assets and activities of banking organizations by 
establishing a minimum acceptable amount  of stable funding based on the liquidity of an 
institution’s assets and activities over a one-year  horizon“,15 it is argued, should facilitate a 
diversification of liquid assets – hence discouraging a situation where they could be accumulated 
and susceptible to exposures such as those  relating to sovereign debts. It will however, be 
highlighted in subsequent sections of the paper, that the two new Basel liquidity standards, will 
probably not achieve their desired objectives where such standards are not coupled with leverage 
ratios.
10  See Basel Committee for Banking Supervision, “Groups of Governors and Heads of Supervision Announce Higher 
Global M inimum Capital Standards” 12 September 2010 at page 2 of 7 <  h  t t p  : / / w  w  w  . b  i s  . o  r g  / p  r e  s  s  / p  1  0  091  2  . p  d  f   ?
noframes=1>
11  ibid
12  For further information on capital conservation buffer and counter cyclical capital buffer, see section D, “Basel III’s 
Efforts to address Capital and Liquidity Requirements”. See also Basel III Compliance Professionals  Association 
(BiiiCPA), “The Basel III Accord: Capital for Systemically Important  Banks Only” <  h  t t p  : / / w  w  w  .b  a  s  e  l - i ii-    
ac  c  o  r d  . c  o  m  >
13  For example,  see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk  Management 
and Supervision” September 2008 at page 1 <  h  t tp  : / / w  w  w  . b  i s  .o  r g  / pu  b  l / b  c  bs  14  4  . h  t m  >; As well as  (banks) being 
regarded as highly leveraged institutions which are considered to be “at the centre of the credit  intermediation 
process”, functions related to credit and maturity transformation are considered to be “vulnerable to liquidity runs 
and  loss of confidence.” See also S Walter, “Basel III: Stronger Banks and a More Resilient  Financial System” 
h  t t p  : / / w  w  w  . bi  s  .o  r g  / s  p  e  ec  h  e  s  / s  p  1  10  40  6  . p  d  f  a  t page 1 of 12
14  See Basel Committee for Banking Supervision, “Consultative Document, International Framework for
Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards and Monitoring” December 2009 at page 3 (11 of 
44)
            
<  h  t t p  : / / w  w  w  . b  i s  . o  r g  / pu  b  l / b  c  bs  1  6  5  . p  d  f>  
15  ibid
7D. Basel III’s Efforts to address Capital and Liquidity Requirements
The incorporation of macro prudential elements into Basel III – in the form of capital buffers, the 
new liquidity   standards, and leverage ratios, can be regarded as efforts aimed at  addressing 
capital and liquidity requirements.
Capital Buffers: Such buffers are intended solely (as well as not exclusively) to address 
problems attributed to pro cyclicality. They consist of:
Counter cyclical capital buffers16
- Capital conservation buffers
Counter cyclical capital buffers and capital conservation buffers constitute macro prudential tools in 
the “time dimension“17  – such tools focusing on the need to mitigate pro-cyclical effects.
Whilst counter cyclical capital buffers and capital conservation buffers are synonymous with capital 
requirements,   equivalent “buffers” which serve to address liquidity imbalances  comprise the 
two new liquidity standards, the Liquid Coverage Ratio (LCR) and the Net  Stable Funding 
Ratio (NSFR). Further, these new liquidity standards and the additional minimum leverage ratio, 
it is argued, “could limit the build-up of financial imbalances during  the expansion phase of the 
financial cycle. In particular, the additional leverage ratio provides an important back stop in cases 
where excessive optimistic point-in-time risk measures tend to  shrink risk weighted assets and 
required cushions.“18
Leverage   Ratios: The   minimum   leverage   ratio   and   the new   liquidity   standards   are 
considered19  to have the potential to limit the build-up of financial imbalances during the 
expansion phase of the financial cycle. Leverage ratios such as debt ratios (ratio of debt to assets); 
debt-equity ratios, usually provide good indication of an entity’s means of financing.  Such ratios 
reflect whether such an entity is able to meet its obligations as it falls due. Hence they also reflect 
how “liquid” a firm is. If the quality of debts issued by an entity is poor, then the possibility of 
redeeming such may result in a situation where the company is left in a  vulnerable position 
(owing to level of losses incurred) – since it finds it difficult to meet its obligations as they fall due. 
The impact of short term borrowing on maturity and liquidity has  been considered in various 
16  With counter cyclical capital buffers, “the build-up of the buffer is encouraged through restrictions on
capital distributions. Authorities would then release the buffer based on signs of strains, such as aggregate 
losses  or tighter credit terms. In both cases, the  exercise of discretion still applies.” See Bank for International 
Settlements, “Macro prudential Policy Tools and Frameworks: Update to G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank 
Governors.” at page 5 <  h  t tp  : / / w  w  w  . bi  s  . o  r g  / p  u  b  l / o  t h  p1  3  . p  d  f >
17  The first of  two dimensions on which macro prudential policies aim to address system wide risk. The  second 
dimension is referred to as “the cross sectional dimension”. The “time-dimension” is defined as “the evolution of 
system-wide risk over time” whilst the “cross sectional dimension” is defined as “the distribution of  risk in the 
financial system – at a given point in time”. See ibid at page 2
18  Ibid at page 6
19  See S Walter, “Basel III: Stronger Banks and a More Resilient Financial System”
            h  t t p  : / / w  w  w  . bi  s  .o  r g  / s  p  e  ec  h  e  s  / s  p  1  10  40  6  . p  d  f  a  t page 6 of 
12
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Deleveraging is a process whereby an undertaking or financial intermediary attempts to reduce 
its balance sheet, for example, by disposing of its assets. Recent Basel III reforms will play a huge 
role in the level of deleveraging (by banks) - which is presently occurring (and which is expected 
to take place in the subsequent months).
E. M acro prudential policies
A macro prudential policy is one which “uses primarily prudential tools to limit systemic or system 
wide financial risk – thereby limiting the incidence of disruptions in the provision of key financial 
services that can have serious consequences for the real economy by:
- Dampening the build-up of financial imbalances and building defences which contain the 
speed and sharpness of subsequent downswings and their effects on the economy;
- Identifying and addressing common exposures, risk concentrations, linkages and 
interdependencies   that are sources of contagion and spill   over risks   that may 
jeopardize the functioning of the system as a whole.“21
Pro cyclicality (as well as its impact), is usually attributed to the aggregational build-up of system 
wide risks over time. Policies which exacerbate cyclical tendencies (for example Basel II’s capital 
requirements)/cyclical effects which are exacerbated during peaks and booms and  which usually 
demonstrate the impact of aggregational effects of cyclical phases, are referred  to as being pro 
cyclical.22
F.  Information gaps in Over-the Counter (OTC) derivative markets –  ongoing 
efforts by the Basel Committee to address these
In   view   of   the   inter   dependencies   between   systemic,   liquidity   risks,   moral   hazard, 
transparency, information asymmetries and disclosure, ongoing efforts by the Committee to address 
information gaps in OTC derivative markets cannot be regarded as surprising. Efforts  being 
undertaken by the Basel Committee, as well as other bodies such as the Financial  Stability 
Board, in focusing on a more system-wide based regulatory process involve the implementation 
20  “Deleveraging also puts additional downward pressure on financial markets.” Furthermore, consequences of short 
term borrowing include “serious liquidity problems especially in the case of financial distress: the funding of long 
term investments through short term debt widens maturity and liquidity gaps, making banks more vulnerable to 
runs.” See N  Papanikolaou and C Wolff, “Leverage and Risk in US Commercial Banking in the Light of the 
Recent Financial Crisis.” March 2011 Draft
21  See Bank for International Settlements, „Macro prudential Policy Tools and Frameworks: Update to G20 Finance M 
inisters and Central Bank Governors” February 2011 at page 2 < h  t t p  : / / w  w  w  . bi  s  .o  r g  / p  u  b  l / o  t h  p  1  3  .p  d  f>  
22  „Leverage ratios serve a macro prudential response – in respect of the cyclical movement of leverage at the system 
wide level. Leverage which tends to build up prior to crisis periods, is subsequently unwound when a crisis occurs. 
This cyclical aspect exacerbates both the upswing phase and the downturn. In addition, what could appear to be very 
low risk assets at the institutional level, can ultimately create incentives for the build-up  of  risks at the broader 
system level.”
9of “time dimension” and “cross sectional dimension” macro prudential  policies, as well as 
plans aimed at facilitating these policies. Such a macro prudential  approach will consequently 
result in greater extension of regulation to the securities markets. Further, it will help facilitate the 
monitoring of vital and useful information such as  market  wide asset prices and liquidity. 
Substantial work is currently taking place to address important data gaps:23
Within the overall programme, priorities involve the provision of information on aspects 
where the absence of good information has proved costly, and in particular:
- i) The inter linkages between large, globally systemically important institutions
- ii)  Emerging  concentrations  of  risk  in  terms  of  both  exposures  and  funding 
dependencies to certain institutions, countries and financial sectors;
- iii) The transfer and ultimate holding of risk
- iv) System wide leverage and maturity mismatches
G. Sovereign Debts and Moral Hazard Attributed to Sovereign Debt Bailouts
During the recent Financial Crisis (as well as the 2010 and ongoing European Sovereign Debt 
Crisis), several governments have had to raise their debt levels in order to stabilize their 
economies. The principal problem attributed to sovereign debts, which is linked to their 
characteristics,24  is the possibility of defaults occurring. Increased doubts in relation to the 
likelihood of larger sovereigns “rolling over maturing debt on their own”, as well as the 
consequential  occurrence of   “very   high,   economically   penalizing,   interest rates”, is 
considered to be the present reality.25
Another problem involves bailouts related to sovereign debts: Whilst bailouts are deemed 
essential in facilitating financial stability, moral hazard, increased costs (particularly with regards 
to high interest rates), attributed to such bailouts need to be addressed. Where bailouts  are 
eventually granted, distressed countries in need of such bailouts should be assisted in completing 
the repayments relating to such bailouts (through the extension of repayment periods or reduced 
interest rates) – rather than aggravating their position (hence facilitating the risk of defaults).
Whilst bailouts, in certain instances, are necessary in order to facilitate financial stability, such 
bailouts should occur as a means of last resort – after other initiatives and remedies have been 
23  See Bank for International Settlements, „Macro prudential Policy Tools and Frameworks: Update to G20 Finance M 
inisters and Central Bank Governors” February 2011 at page 3 < h  t t p  : / / w  w  w  . bi  s  .o  r g  / p  u  b  l / o  t h  p  1  3  .p  d  f>  
24  Sovereign debts differ from private debts in view of the fact that: 
- Collateral is rarely ever provided;
- No direct means exist to ensure the enforcement of the repayment of sovereign debts
- No specified procedures exist in respect of a sovereign debtor who is unwilling to pay. See S  Brandauer, 
“Sovereign Debt and Economic Policies in Global Markets: A Political Economy Approach”  (2006) – 
particularly chapter on “Domestic Debt as a Commitment Device – A Probabilistic Voting Model of Sovereign 
Debt” at page 20 h  t t p  : / / e  d  o  c  .u  b  . u  ni  - m  u  e  n  c  h  e  n  . d  e  / 5  0  8  2  / 1  /B  r a  n  d  a  u  e  r _    S t e  f a  n  . p  d  f  (last visited 19 May 2012)
25  See N Economides and R C Smith, „Trichet Bonds To Resolve the European Sovereign Debt Problem“
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applied and sought.
On March 12 2011, EU officials announced the following remedies – as a means of sustaining
European sovereign debt markets:26
− Doubling the lending capacity of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF)27  from 
220 billion Euros to 440 billion Euros
− Purchasing the sovereign debt of primary markets, as needed
− Extending the repayment period for and lower than the interest rate charged on
Greece’s rescue loans.
It is not surprising that yields on the ten year Spanish, Greek and Portuguese bonds soared to new 
records, following the announcement. Such reaction serves only to justify the assertion that bailouts 
should not always be granted liberally without having consulted other measures. Sovereign debts, as 
highlighted earlier on in the abstract (and this section of the paper), given their nature, are more 
susceptible to defaults than other forms   of private debts. The  possibilities of such defaults 
occurring are further increased where bailouts are granted in relation to these debts.
Distressed countries, once granted bail-outs, should be given full assurance (by grantors of the bail-
outs) that continued assistance will be provided in the form of accompanying aids to  assist in 
completing repayments relating to such bailouts (through the extension of repayment  periods or 
reduced  interest rates) – rather than aggravating their position (hence facilitating  the risk of 
defaults).
According to Economides and Smith, the European authorities’ solution relating to the EC B’s 
purchase of outstanding sovereign debt in the market (as of January 2011) had only succeeded in 
buying a small amount of the distressed debt whilst pushing bond prices upwards as a result  of 
such intervention. They propose the creation of so called “Trichet Bonds” which are intended to 
be ”new long duration bonds issued by countries in the EU area  that are to be  collateralized by 
zero-coupon bonds of the same duration issued by the ECB“.28  Advantages  attributed to such 
“Trichet Bonds” are as follows:29
26  See N Isaac, „EU Bailouts Fail to Keep European Sovereign Debt Markets Afloat“ April 2011
            
<  h  t t p  : / / w  w  w  . e  ll  i o  t t w  a  v  e  . co  m>  
27  On the 9th   May 2010, Europe’s Finance Ministers approved the creation of the European Financial  Stability 
Facility – which is aimed at preserving financial stability in Europe (through the provision of financial assistance to 
Euro zone states during periods of economic difficulty). The objective of the EFSF being the collection of funds and 
the provision of loans in conjunction with the IMF to address the financing needs of  Euro area member states in 
difficulty. Euro area member states are to provide guarantees for EFSF issuance of up to a total of 440 billion euro 
on a pro rata basis. See G Calice, J Chen and J Williams, “Liquidity Interactions in Credit Markets: An Analysis of 
the Euro zone Sovereign Debt Crisis> at page 1 of 41
    <  h  t t p  : / / p  a  p  e  r s  . s  s  r n  . c  o  m  / s  o  l 3  /p  a  p  e  r s  . c  f m    ?abstract_id=1776425>
28  See N Economides and R C Smith, „Trichet Bonds to Resolve the European Sovereign Debt Problem“
at page 2 
<  h  t t p  : / / ss  r n  . c  o  m  / a  b  s  t r a  c  t =1836743>
29  Ibid at pages 5 and 6
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− Trichet Bonds Eliminate Uncertainties in respect of the Refinancing Distressed 
Countries’ Maturing Debt
− Trichet Bonds will be of much higher quality than present sovereign debt of distressed 
countries
− Trichet bonds will be liquid
− Trichet bonds will require no bailouts and imply no moral hazard
− Trichet Bonds provide debt relief for distressed economies
− The exchange is voluntary and beneficial to both countries and debt holders
Such Trichet bonds, indeed, would have provided a better alternative to the remedies 
announced by EU officials on March 12, 2011. Had such Trichet bonds been considered as an 
initial resort, and given the existence of appropriate and adequate incentives for countries issuing 
such bonds, as well as debt holders to participate in the exchange process, they could have served as 
better initial options than the subsequent European bailouts.
Any possibilities or likelihood of successfully implementing such Trichet bonds at present, should 
be considered doubtful since no incentives would appear to exist – with respect to distressed EU 
countries such as Greece, Spain, Ireland and Portugal, in issuing such bonds. This is attributed to 
the fact that such countries having had a “better offer” in agreeing to the March 12 2011 remedies, 
are likely to be more reluctant to purchase “zero coupon collateral  bonds” directly from the 
(European Central Bank) EC B. Apart from addressing whether such countries are able to “apply 
some of (or any of) their reserves held by the ECB for this purpose, or otherwise enter into an 
appropriate financing package with the ECB,“30   there would appear to be less incentives for such 
countries to issue these Trichet bonds since they have relatively long term obligations ( ten year 
bonds) at present. For these reasons, such  possibilities of having provided a collateral with 
exchanged sovereign bonds (via the issue of Trichet bonds by distressed European countries), have 
been significantly reduced. There is  now increased likelihood (with increased national deficits of 
certain distressed countries) that defaults will occur.
II. Should sovereign debts be encouraged?
Increased costs31  of sovereign debts will not only discourage investors in purchasing such debts 
(hence promoting a situation where higher yields occur) but would also increase  possibilities 
where some bond holders (investors) may have to share costs attributed to future  bailouts – with 
possibilities that taxpayers could even become involved in the cost sharing process.
Sovereign debts should be encouraged: i) where such debts are required for the stabilization  of 
30  See ibid at page 5
31  Booming deficits and the need to finance banking bailouts worth billions have turned sovereign bonds into the new 
“junk debt market”. Investors are now paying $88,000 to insure $I million worth of debt issued  by a group of 
sovereign countries – or 88 basis points – more than the $83,000 paid to insure $1 million worth of corporate debt. 
The growing problems of the Greek economy during 2010 resulted in the cost of its protection against default rising 
to more than 400 basis points.” See E Moya, “Greece and the Rising Costs of Sovereign Bonds” 29 January 2010 
<  h  t t p  : / / w  w  w  . g  u  a  r d  ia  n  . c  o  . u  k  / b  usi  n  es  s  / 2  0  1  0  / j a  n  / 2  9  / g  r e  e  c  e  - d  e  b  t - e  u  -  sovereign-bonds>
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economies and; ii) where some form of collateral accompanies such debts.
H. Role of New Basel Liquidity Standards in M itigating Sovereign Debt Crises
It is argued that the new liquidity standards should help facilitate greater diversification of the pool 
of liquid assets held by banks – contrary to the argument presented by those who are of the opinion 
that the new liquidity standards will facilitate a situation where a concentration of  government 
debts are encouraged.32 According to the Basel Committee’s most recent impact  study, “bank 
holdings of liquid assets – which continue to be dominated by exposures to sovereigns, central 
banks and zero percent risk weighted public sector entities, comprise 85 % of banks’ liquid assets.“33  
Having considered both new liquidity standards,34  it could be said that the second standard, that is 
the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) Standard, is more likely to facilitate a situation where assets 
are concentrated and susceptible to sovereign exposures. In any case, the crucial issue relates to the 
need to address the liquidity needs of such banking entities – and consideration of the fact that such 
standards did not exist previously – hence  contributing to the fuelling of systemic and liquidity 
risks which triggered the recent Financial Crisis.
Furthermore, the additional leverage ratios which are to be introduced35    by the Basel 
Committee, should help in facilitating the diversification of liquid assets. The two new 
standards,  on their own, would probably not be able to effectively achieve the objective of 
diversification of liquid assets.
Leverage ratios will therefore play vital roles at the present time (and in the future) by:
− Helping to facilitate the diversification of assets – liquid assets in particular (and with 
respect to the new liquidity standards); and
− Helping to avoid the present consequential effects of Basel III – where banks, in an aim to 
achieve regulatory capital and leverage ratio requirements, are compelled into a  situation where 
aggressive de leverage occurs.
32  See S Walter, „Basel III: Stronger Banks and a More Resilient Financial System“
            h  t t p  : / / w  w  w  . bi  s  .o  r g  / s  p  e  ec  h  e  s  / s  p  1  10  40  6  . p  d  f  a  t page 4 of 
12
33  ibid
34  “The first objective of the two  standards is to promote the short-term resiliency of the liquidity risk  profile of 
institutions by ensuring that they have sufficient high quality liquid resources to survive an acute stress  scenario 
lasting for one month. The Committee developed the Liquidity Coverage Ratio to achieve this objective.“
35  “The Basel Committee agreed to introduce a simple, transparent, non-risk based leverage ratio that is calibrated to 
act as a credible supplementary measure to the risk based capital requirements. The leverage ratio is  intended to 
achieve the objectives of constraining  the build-up of leverage in the banking  sector, helping  avoid  destabilizing 
deleveraging processes which can damage the broader financial system and the economy; and reinforcing the risk 
based requirements with a simple non-risk based “back stop” measure.”  See Basel  Committee on Banking 
Supervision, “Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework for More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems” at pages 
68-69 of 77
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I. How Can the New Basel Liquidity Standards be Implemented More 
Optimally to   Mitigate Sovereign Debt Crises: Importance of Information 
Channels
Market Liquidity and Sovereign Debts: Monitoring of Information Channels
“Manipulation of market liquidity is often the primary mechanism through which speculative 
attacks are channeled and in this case, the object of interest is the bilateral liquidity structure of the 
sovereign debt market and the sovereign CDS (Credit Default  Swap) market.“36   The  role and 
impact of the manipulation of the CDS  market by speculative investors in  exacerbating the 
liquidity dry up in the market for Greek, Irish, Portuguese and Spanish sovereign debts,  during 
the  2010 Euro Crisis, raised concerns amongst several commentators.37
In this respect, greater focus on Pillar 3 of Basel II and the ever increasing need for greater 
measures aimed at extending capital rules (as well as other regulatory measures) to the securities 
markets, comes into play. If securities markets were not so lightly regulated as is the  case with 
banks, less opportunities would be  presented  to investors who are able to manipulate38  C D S 
markets. Measures aimed at facilitating   greater   enhanced disclosures  continue to play a vital 
role in facilitating market discipline. However, in order to reduce incidences of “manipulation” 
by speculative investors, greater discretion in respect of the timing and release of information to 
investors, will be required. Just as information plays a  crucial role in fuelling bank runs, it  also 
plays a vital role in manipulation within the C D S  markets. Regulations   which   are able to 
address   “short-term speculative short selling  practices” in respect of sovereign debts will be 
required within the C D S markets.
It has also been demonstrated that “whilst liquidity of the sovereign debt market dried up over the 
Crisis period of 2010, the liquidity of the C D S market increase dramatically with spread bids and 
spreads asked (offered) – approaching a one to one ratio.”
J.  Conclusion
As highlighted in a previous paper, “the monitoring of useful data - such as market-wide data on 
asset prices and liquidity, institution related information such as credit default swap (CDS) spreads 
and equity prices, additional institution-specific information related to the ability of the institution 
to fund itself in various wholesale funding markets, and the price at which it  can do so, will be 
36  See G Calice, J Chen and J Williams, “Liquidity Interactions in Credit Markets: An Analysis of the Euro zone 
Sovereign Debt Crisis> at page 5 of 41 <  h  t t p  : / / p  ap  e  r s  . s  s  r n  . c  o  m  / s  o  l 3  / p  a  p  e  r s  . c  f m    ? abstract_id=1776425>
37  See ibid at page 2 of 41
38  “In particular, “naked” C D S positions were blamed for driving bond  yields on Greek, Irish, Spanish  and 
Portuguese debt higher during the first half of 2010. Further, the manipulation of the C D S market by 
speculative investors was considered to have played a vital role in facilitating the dry up in the market for such 
countries’ sovereign debts. See ibid
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vital in obtaining a source of instantaneous data on potential liquidity problems.“39
In relation to the “cross sectional dimensional aspect” of the Basel Committee’s macro 
prudential policies, several provisions in Basel III should help to “address system risk and 
interconnectedness among (global) systemic institutions, by mitigating the risks arising from firm-
level “cross dimensional”approachexposures.  
These  include:  higher  capital  requirements for trading and derivative activities, complex 
securitizations and off balance  sheet exposures, capital incentives  for banks   to use central 
counter parties for OTC  derivatives; liquidity requirements that better address   funding risks 
related to excessive reliance on wholesale short term funding.“40
Until intended leverage ratios are introduced and coupled with the new liquidity standards 
[namely: the (Liquid Coverage Ratio) L C R and the Net stable Funding Ratio (NSFR)]; these 
standards will probably not achieve half their desired effects – since liquid assets could be 
accumulated under these standards, such as to   an extent where they are susceptible to 
sovereign exposures. This is one reason (amongst many),41 for concluding that whilst the Basel 
Committee has  gone a long way in addressing liquidity risks, its  efforts still remain a  modest 
milestone in combating liquidity risks in prudential supervision.
39  See M Ojo, „Preparing for Basel I V – Why Liquidity Risks Still Present a Challenge to Regulators in Prudential 
Supervision (II); and also Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, “Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework 
for More Resilient  Banks and Banking Systems”
            
<  h  t t p  : / / w  w  w  . b  i s  . o  r g  / pu  b  l / b  c  bs  1  8  9  . p  d  f>  
40  Bank for International Settlements, „Macro prudential Policy Tools and Frameworks: Update to G20
Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors” February 2011 at page 7 < h  t t p  : / / w  w  w  . b  i s  .o  r g  / pu  b  l /o  t h  p  1  3  .p  d  f>  
41  Further challenges presented to Basel III include the restrictions imposed on it by the Dodd Frank Act – even 
though the Act is similar to Basel III in several respects (for example, in respect of its requirements of more 
stringent capital and liquidity standards, and a non risk leverage ratio).
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